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The end of the Cold War calls for new policies in Asia. To maintain stability and
prosperity in the Asia Pacific region, the U.S. needs to restructure its forward-deployed
presence. This restructuring will satisfy both domestic pressures and the security
concerns of the countries in the region. The first part of this thesis will examine the
relationship between Japan and the U.S. from the end of World War n through the end of
the U.S.-Soviet Cold War and how this policy is developed within the United States. The
next chapters will be devoted to the external factors that influence the U.S.-Japan alliance
including waning public opinion in Japan for support of U.S. troops, the Asian economic
crisis, and fears of Japanese militarism and of revived nationalism within Japan. This
thesis will suggest ways to calm these fears including the continued development of
regional security groups. Such measures represent a tremendous task, which, if
accomplished, will allow for the reduction of the U.S. forces in the region without the
creation of a power vacuum. This thesis argues in favor of a reduction that gives primacy
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One of the United States' major allies in the victory of capitalism over Soviet
communism was Japan. The end of the Cold War marked a shift in the U.S.-Japan
alliance, as both countries searched for ways to keep stability and prosperity in the region
that is bogged down by remnants of the Cold War, as well as by significant mistrust
between several of the countries of the region. This search continues as we approach the
21
st
century. Many analysts disagree about the role that U.S. and Japanese military forces
should play in the Asia Pacific region in the new era. It is the goal of this thesis to assist
the process of developing guidelines for the revised alliance between the U.S. and Japan
and determine the roles and the shapes of the forces that will carry this alliance and
regional stability into the next century. The United States, throughout the 1990s, has
been reducing military spending while increasing the roles of the military in areas such as
humanitarian assistance and operations other than war (OOTW). This trend can not
continue. The United States military is already feeling the effects of being undermanned
and overworked as retention and recruitment have both diminished in the post-Cold War
years. One way to alleviate these accumulating pressures placed on the U.S. military is to
reshape its forward-deployed presence. The forward-deployed troops in Asia represent
such an opportunity.
This thesis will begin with an historical examination of the complementary
aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance. From the end of World War JJ through the end of the
U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the relationship between Japan and the U.S. was developed and
IX
has evolved greatly. The culmination of this evolution, so far, came in the Clinton-
Hashimoto summit of 1996. Through this summit, the countries developed the U.S.-
Japan Joint Declaration on Security and conducted an extensive review of Japan's
Defense Guidelines. The first chapter will chart this historical evolution and describe the
guidelines from which the two countries now function to maintain stability and prosperity
in the Asia Pacific region. With a definition of these guidelines as a foundation, the paper
will then examine how this policy was developed within the U.S. government. This will
include an analysis of congressional politics in the making of foreign policy. The tools
for such an analysis will include the concepts of strategic myths and shaping of issues.
Included in this analysis will be the influence of the so-called Nye Initiative on foreign
policy toward Japan.
With the factors internal to the U.S. examined, the next chapter will be devoted to
the external factors that influence the U.S.-Japan alliance. The first of these is the waning
Japanese public support for the maintenance of U.S. troops in their country. This shift in
public opinion is increasingly calling for a change in the status quo - a problem that will
have to be dealt with by both countries if a successful alliance is to continue. Also, the
current Asian economic crisis has been sufficiently felt in Japan. Japan currently pays
five billion annually to maintain the U.S. troops stationed in Japan. This financial
relationship may not be feasible for the Japanese in the future and will be addressed in
this chapter.
It is not the point of this thesis to argue for the removal of all U.S. forces from
Asia. Rather, it is to prove that a reshaping of the U.S. forward deployed troops can be
accomplished to alleviate pressures at home, while, at the same time, maintaining
stability in the Asia Pacific region. Chapter V will argue that the Forward Deployed
Naval Forces, namely Seventh Fleet, can accomplish the goals that forward deployment
seeks to accomplish. Many of the other forces, such as a large number of ground troops,
can serve their same purpose from the United States. Finally, this chapter will suggest an
overall force structure that answers to all of the above concerns, domestically and
internationally, and could serve to perpetuate stability in the region and the relationships
between the region's countries and the U.S.
Chapter VI will analyze the external factors that affect the alliance and the roles of
the two countries in the region that lie beyond the borders of Japan. The wars of the past
have instilled a fear of the re-militarism of Japan, especially within Korea and China,
both of which having been occupied by the Japanese in the past. This chapter will
suggest ways to calm these fears including the continued development of regional
security groups. The U.S. can enhance this development by encouraging transparency
among all of the players and continuing to pursue diplomatic and economic relations with
China, while, at the same time, developing greater roles for the militaries of these
countries within the region. Such measures represent a tremendous task, but, to do so,
will allow the reduction of the U.S. forces in the region without the creation of a power
vacuum. Such a reduction is in tune with the downsizing initiatives that have been and





The end of the Cold War marks a shift in United States (U.S.) foreign policy from
stopping the spread of communism to engagement of the former adversary states and
newly industrialized countries. Remnants of the Cold War remain, though, in Asia. The
most obvious of these remnants is the divided Korean peninsula. Other remnants include
the tensions between mainland China and Taiwan and remaining territorial disputes
between Japan and Russia. The most troubling remnant, though, is the continued
presence of 100,000 American troops in the Asia Pacific region. The removal or
restructuring of these troops should become a priority of U.S. policy in the region. The
U.S. troops are relics of the Cold War and the rationale for their presence has
disappeared. The waning public opinion in both Japan and the U.S. for maintaining these
troops in the region, the current Asian economic crisis, and the American desire to reduce
defense expenditures also provide ample justification for restructuring the forward-
stationed troops.
One of the United States' major allies in the victory of capitalism over Soviet
communism was Japan. The end of the Cold War marked a shift in the U.S.-Japan
alliance, as both countries searched for ways to keep stability and prosperity in the region
that is bogged down by these remnants of the Cold War, as well as by significant mistrust
between several of the countries of the region. This search continues as we approach the
21
st
century. Many analysts disagree about the role that U.S. and Japanese military forces
should play in the Asia Pacific region in the new era. It is the goal of this thesis to assist
the process of developing guidelines for the new alliance between the U.S. and Japan and
determine the roles and the shapes of the forces that will carry this alliance and regional
stability into the next century. The United States, throughout the 1990s, has been
reducing military spending while increasing the roles of the military in areas such as
humanitarian assistance and operations other than war (OOTW). This trend can not
continue. The United States military is already feeling the effects of being undermanned
and overworked as retention and recruitment have both diminished in the post-Cold War
years. One way to alleviate these accumulating pressures placed on the U.S. military is to
reshape our forward-deployed presence. The forward-deployed troops in Asia represent
such an opportunity.
The collapse of the Soviet Union transformed the international system
substantially, but a corresponding shift in U.S. grand strategy has not followed.
Christopher Layne called for a shift in this grand strategy from preponderance, which the
U.S. practiced from 1945-1991 and still does, to a strategy of offshore balancing.
1
Offshore balancing would define U.S. interests in terms of defending the United States'
territorial integrity and preventing the rise of a Eurasian hegemon. As an offshore
balancer, the U.S. would disengage from its military commitments in Europe, Japan, and
South Korea. 2 This thesis' proposal stops short of offshore balancing and suggests a
strategy of power projection, or limited forward deployment, with U.S. Naval forces as
the centerpiece. Preventing a Eurasian hegemon is not the goal of this power projection
strategy, rather, it seeks to groom the potential Northeast Asian hegemonies, under Japan
1
Layne, Christopher, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing, America's Future Grand Strategy,
International Security Vol. 22, No.l (Summer 1997), 86-124.
2
Layne, 112.
and China, to become benign forms of hegemony. This strategy proposes a rational
structure to meet the current security challenges, not a call for American isolationism,
which is what some consider Layne's offshore balancing to be.
The U.S.-Japan security relationship has historically had economic implications.
Japan's "free ride" from the U.S. enabled them to climb out of the ruins that World War
II left them in. This relationship into the 21 st century is no different. In the post-Cold
War era, the U.S. is searching for ways to reduce defense expenditures. The U.S. strategy
of preponderance is expensive and the U.S. needs to find ways to stretch its defense
dollars. The Asian economic crisis is also affecting the U.S. role in the region. Both
Japan and South Korea may find it difficult to continue to support American troops on
their soil with generous Host Nation Support. Thus, the strategy of limited forward-
deployment calls for restationing the majority of the ground and air troops from Japan
and Korea to other American bastions in the Pacific, namely Hawaii and Guam.
The implementation of such a strategy of limited forward deployment would be
met with several obstacles. Public support for the existing forward-deployed structure is
waning, both in Japan and the U.S.. Public opinion in both countries is increasingly
calling for a change in the status quo. While the pressures for change are significant, the
pressures within the region to maintain the U.S. force structure may be even stronger.
The U.S. presence, it is argued, has been the balancing factor ensuring peace and stability
in the region. Many fear that if the U.S. changes its force composition in the region, then
it would be perceived by the countries of the region that the U.S. is no longer committed
to the security of the region. The withdrawal of U.S. troops supposedly would create a
power vacuum in the region, which would spur an arms race among the countries of the
region to fill this vacuum. The result, it is argued, would be regional instability. Coupled
with this possible arms race is the fear of the remilitarization of Japan by the other
countries of the region. These historical confrontations make the restructuring of U.S.
troops in Northeast Asia a complicated problem.
Many analysts argue that a diminished U.S. troop presence in East Asia would act
as a centrifugal force pushing the countries of the region further away from each other,
instigating arms races in the region and overall instability. This thesis will argue that
reducing the U.S. presence can accomplish the opposite, acting as a centripetal force.
This force can pull the countries of the region toward multilateralism in dealing with the
security issues in the region, as well as alleviate the domestic pressures in both the U.S.
and Japan that forward-stationing causes. Such an approach represents a libertarian,
conservative alternative to the conventional analyses shared by mainstream analysts and
military officials.
The methodology used in this thesis will be a case study of the evolution of the
U.S.-Japan security relationship. This historical analysis will then used to suggest ways
to perpetuate the U.S.-Japan security relationship and maintain stability in the Asia
Pacific region. This thesis will begin with an historical examination of the
complementary aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance. From the end of World War JJ
through the end of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the relationship between Japan and the U.S.
was developed and has evolved greatly. The culmination of this evolution, so far, came
in the Clinton-Hashimoto summit of 1996. Through this summit, the countries developed
the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and conducted an extensive review of
Japan's Defense Guidelines. The first chapter will chart this historical evolution and
describe the guidelines from which the two countries now function to maintain stability
and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region.
With a definition of these guidelines as a foundation, the paper will then examine
how this policy was developed within the U.S. government. This will include an analysis
of congressional politics in the making of foreign policy. The tools for such an analysis
will include the concepts of strategic myths and shaping of issues. Included in this
analysis will be the influence of the so-called Nye Initiative on foreign policy toward
Japan.
With the factors internal to the U.S. examined, the next chapter will be devoted to
the external factors that influence the U.S.-Japan alliance. The first of these is the waning
Japanese public support for the maintenance of U.S. troops in their country. The
Okinawan rape incident of 1995 and the "Sasebo slashing" of 1996, among other crimes
by U.S. personnel stationed in Japan, have caused a drastic shift in Japanese public
opinion. This shift in public opinion is increasingly calling for a change in the status quo
- a problem that will have to be dealt with by both countries if a successful alliance is to
continue. Also, the current Asian economic crisis has been sufficiently felt in Japan.
Japan currently pays five billion annually to maintain the U.S. troops stationed in Japan.
This financial relationship may not be feasible for the Japanese in the future and will be
addressed in this chapter.
It is not the point of this thesis to argue for the removal of all U.S. forces from
Asia. Rather, it is to prove that a reshaping of the U.S. forward deployed troops can be
accomplished to alleviate pressures at home, while, at the same time, maintaining
stability in the Asia Pacific region. Chapter V will argue that the Forward Deployed
Naval Forces, namely Seventh Fleet, can accomplish the goals that forward deployment
seeks to accomplish. Many of the other forces, such as a large number of ground troops,
can serve their same purpose from the United States. Finally, this chapter will suggest an
overall force structure that answers to all of the above concerns, domestically and
internationally, and could serve to perpetuate stability in the region and the relationships
between the region's countries and the U.S.
Chapter VI will analyze the external factors that affect the alliance and the roles
of the two countries in the region that lie beyond the borders of Japan. The wars of the
past have instilled a fear of the re-militarism of Japan, especially within Korea and China,
both of which having been occupied by the Japanese in the past. This chapter will
suggest ways to calm these fears including the continued development of regional
security groups. The U.S. can enhance this development by encouraging transparency
among all of the players and continuing to pursue diplomatic and economic relations with
China, while, at the same time, developing greater roles for the militaries of these
countries within the region. Such an analysis will include a plan for the Koreanization of
Korean defense with regard to North Korea, and greater roles for the already well-
established Japanese Self Defense Forces - all in collaboration with the People's
Republic of China. Such measures represent a tremendous task, but, to do so, will allow
the reduction of the U.S. forces in the region without the creation of a power vacuum.
Such a reduction is in tune with the downsizing initiatives that have been and will
continue to be a prime factor in U.S. defense planning throughout the first half of the next
century.

n. EVOLUTION OF FORMAL U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
The end of the Cold War required a reassessment of U.S. foreign policy. With the
great threat diminished, the relationship between the U.S. and foreign countries also had
to change. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Asia Pacific region and the U.S.
alliance with Japan. The Clinton-Hashimoto Summit of April 1996 marked an attempt by
both Japan and the U.S., enemies just fifty three years ago, to collaborate in constructing
the best strategy of defense for the Asia Pacific region. On paper, the "Japan-U.S. Joint




and the follow-on "Japan
Defense Guidelines Review"4 look very promising in sketching out a new role for the
military of Japan in maintaining peace and prosperity in the region. But history has
shown that defense treaties between the U.S. and Japan have not always been binding.
Japanese defense policy since the end of World War n has been the result of
compromises between the desires of the U.S. and the inability of Japan to satisfy these
desires. Japanese defense policy "on paper" is often much different than their defense
policy "in practice" due to constitutional restraints on military action, Japanese public
opinion, and the failure of Japanese politicians to manipulate either. To ensure security
and prosperity into the 21 st century for both countries, the U.S. needs to ensure that Japan
follows up on its stated desires at the Clinton-Hashimoto Summit to become a
collaborative security partner of the U.S. in the Asia Pacific region. One way that the
3





U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, "Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.
Japan Defense Cooperation."
[http://www.usia.gov/regional/ea/easec/sccguideJitm].
U.S. can ensure that Japan fulfills a role in the region more in line with her capabilities is
to reduce the size and structure of forward deployed American troops in the region. The
revised alliance represents a means for Washington to devolve the U.S. global policeman
role to a regional power that can assume burdens, costs, and responsibilities that
Americans no longer want to bear to the Cold War extent. 5 To understand how the U.S.-
Japan relationship got where it is today, it proves beneficial to look at how it has
developed since the end of World War EL
A. YOSHIDA DOCTRINE
The key figure in shaping the postwar conception of Japanese national purpose
was Yoshida Shigeru, who was Prime Minister for seven years of the early postwar
period. The cold war changed American policy toward Japan drastically. As the Soviet
threat increased, the United States developed a need for an integrated defense strategy in
the region; a defense strategy to include Japan, steering them away from neutrality and
toward the side of the United States in the bipolar world. Japan negotiated its initial
mutual security arrangements with the United States at the end of the occupation while
still giving primacy to economic growth under what became known as the Yoshida
Doctrine.
Foreign observers ordinarily understood Japan's political passivity as a result of
popular consent and the restraints imposed on it by its 1946 constitution. This, in part,
was true. Japanese society had developed a resentment of war and the military in
general. But Yoshida used the restraints of Article 9 of the constitution to his advantage
5
Olsen, Edward A., "Liberal U.S. Motives Have Conservative Results in Security Pact; Larger Role for
Japan Means Gradual Shift of Regional Burden," The Nikkei Weekly, August 19, 1996, 7.
10
to avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues and concentrate
exclusively on economic rehabilitation. Article 9, as finally adopted reads:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the proceeding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
It was the intent of the constitution drafters to prevent Japan from ever again developing
a war machine such as the one that endangered world security in World War U. But
when the international scene changed, and America developed a need for Japan as an
ally, the Japanese used the constitution to their advantage to steer clear of binding
security arrangements. The contention that the constitution constrained the establishment
of self-defense forces or participation in the United Nations or other multilateral security
arrangements was devised by Japanese politicians for subsequent political purposes.6
Yoshida made this point clear when he told a future prime minister, Miyazawa Kiichi, at
the time that:
The day [for rearmament] will come naturally when our livelihood recovers. It
may sound devious, but let the Americans handle [our security] until then. It is
indeed our Heaven-bestowed good fortune that the Constitution bans arms. If the
Americans complain, the Constitution gives us a perfect justification. The
politicians who want to amend it are fools. 7
Pyle, Kenneth B., The Japanese Question (Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 1992), 10.
7
Tetsuya Kataoka, The Price ofa Constitution: The Origin ofJapan's Postwar Politics (Crane Russak Co.
1991).
11
Whatever the virtue of Article 9 may have been when the United States pressed Japanese
political leaders to adopt it after World War II, the article is now an obstacle to a
worthwhile and equitable U.S.-Japanese relationship. 8
B. THE COLD WAR YEARS
The cold war made Japan strategically important for the United States. This gave
the Japanese, and Yoshida, leverage. The United States could benefit from an
industrially strong Japan and Japan's geographic position was key to the deterrence of
Communist aggression. It was under these auspices that Yoshida negotiated Japan's
future. The cold war structure of international politics enabled Japan to regain its
independence and shaped the Mutual Security Treaty that was eventually enacted in
1952. Under the Mutual Security Treaty, Japan was given a long term guarantee of its
security by the United States in exchange for the establishment of American military
bases in Japan and the establishment of what eventually became the Japanese Self
Defense Forces. This arrangement was what later to be coined as Japan's "free ride." 9
Japan gained national security under America's "nuclear umbrella" while making no
guarantee as to commitment of forces for United States' defense. The low military
spending required for Japan's Self Defense Forces turned out to be a key factor in Japan's
economic advance. These negotiations proved to serve Japan for the next several decades
and prompted former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to declare in his memoirs that,
8
Carpenter, Ted Galen, "Pacific Fraud: The New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines," CATO Daily
Commentary, October 16, 1997.
9
Fairbank, John K., Reischauer, Edwin O., and Craig, Albert M., East Asia: Tradition and Transformation
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 826.
12
"Japanese decisions have been the most far-sighted and intelligent of any major nation of
the postwar era."
10
Thus, by 1952, the U.S.-Japan security relationship and the scope of Japanese
defense policy were becoming clear. Two years later, the U.S. and Japan signed the
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement that formally acknowledged Japan's commitment
to limited rearmament. The agreement stated that "Japan will make, consistent with the
political and economic stability of Japan, the full contribution permitted by its manpower,
resources, facilities, and general economic conditions to the development and
maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world,
and take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense
capacities."
11
This agreement opened the door for the official and legal establishment of the
Japanese Self Defense Forces. The Self Defense Forces Laws and the Defense Agency
Establishment Law were passed in mid- 1954 and marked the official rebirth of the
Japanese military. Although the U.S. at this time was looking to develop an ally with a
formidable military to combat communist aggression in the region and take a larger role
in regional security, what actually came from the establishment of the Self Defense
Forces was nothing more than a national police force. In reality, the Japanese Defense
Forces existed on two levels. Militarily, they existed primarily to protect against the
10
Kissinger, Henry, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 324.
11
U.S. Department of State, "Mutual Defense Assistance," March 8, 1954, TIAS No. 2957, United States
Treaties and Other International Agreements, 669.
13
internal communist threat. Diplomatically, their establishment was a compromise
accepted by the Japanese to gain the explicit U.S. security guarantee that Japan wanted.
The laws did authorize Japanese force levels that would make it an attractive partner in a
more comprehensive security arrangement with the U.S., but, at that time, they had not
developed those forces. 12
In 1957, Japan defined her defense policy under the Basic Policy for National
Defense. The tenets of which are as follows:
The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression,
but once invaded, to repel such action, thereby preserving the independence and
peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles.
To achieve this objective, the government of Japan hereby establishes the
following principles:
1. To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international
cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace;
2. To promote public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country,
thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security;
3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self
defense, with regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic
situation.
4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the U.S.-Japan security
arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the
future in deterring and repelling such aggression. 13
The Basic Defense Policy justified the gradual build up of the Japanese Self Defense
Forces throughout the 1950s, although primacy was given to the economic development
of the country and defense spending was limited to one percent of the Gross National
Product (GNP).
12
Weinstein, M. E., "The Evolution of the Japan Self Defense Forces," in The Modern Japanese Military
System, ed. James H. Buck, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), 45.
13
Japanese Defense Agency, Defense ofJapan 1992, 65 (translated into English by Japan Times Ltd.).
14
The existing alliance had not proved completely satisfactory to either partner, thus
it was revised in the form of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between
Japan and the U.S. in January of 1960. This treaty served to replace the Mutual Security
Treaty of 1952 and still remains the working document of the Japanese Defense Agency.
With the Self Defense Forces fully established by 1960, this treaty defined the
possibilities of their use in support of U.S. and U.N. initiatives. Article I of the treaty
states that both countries will "refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."
14 The treaty
marks a pledge of support by Japan to the U.N., although their forces have rarely been
used for such purposes, and when they have, the have been used in insignificant manners.
Other articles of importance are Article in, which states that "the parties will maintain
and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed
attack," and Article V which states that "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack
against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common
danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." 1 Inherent in both
articles are the limits placed on Japan by its Constitution, as Article 9 strictly prohibits
them from the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. This
remains a point of contention today in Japanese security policy. Also noticeable in the
14
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America.
[http://club.jpn.net/infomofa/ju/q_a/sec/ref_01Jitml].
15
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation.
15
Treaty is the fact that the reciprocity of action only applies in Japanese territories, the
treaty makes no provisions for Japan aiding the U.S. in defense of the United States or
other U.S. interests. Also of relevance in the Treaty is Article VI, which grants the U.S.
military the use of Japanese facilities to "contribute to the security of Japan and the
maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." 16
These are the tenets of the U.S.-Japan alliance with which both countries carried
into the 1990s. The world order has changed since the creation of the above treaties, and
many American and Japanese analysts alike feel that the alliance needs to be revamped to
match the existing world structure. The collapse of the Soviet empire, the normalization
of U.S.-China relations under President Carter, and the rapid and complete economic
successes of Japan have changed the needs and capabilities of both countries. The
bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Japan need to reflect these changes.
C. U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY INTO THE 21ST CENTURY
President Clinton and former Prime Minister Hashimoto met in an April 1996
summit in an attempt to redefine the relationship between the countries and their security
alliance. The results of that summit have been the topic of many arguments among
analysts who disagree on the role that the U.S. and Japanese forces, respectively, should
play in the Asia region. Some analysts feel that the U.S. needs to remain engaged in the
region and keep its troops forward deployed because if they are removed, it would create
a dangerous power vacuum in Asia, which could spur an arms race among Asian
16




Other analysts feel that the proper U.S. role in the region is solely to keep
sea-lanes open and project American power through the use of naval forces. 18 The
summit provided valuable dialogue between the two countries, but did not commit Japan
"hard and fast" to any specific action. This is a position that Japan has been in before - if
they had promised specific action, then they would be setting themselves up for failure,
thus deteriorating their relationship with the U.S., if they failed to come through on their
promised actions. Therefore, what they did promise at the summit was to discuss and
consider the greater commitments that the U.S. desired for them. For this alliance to be
of continued significance into the next century, the U.S. must convince Japan to commit
to specific action.
The summit resulted in both countries agreeing that greater bilateral cooperation
will be necessary in the future between the U.S. and Japan in dealing with the
uncertainties of the region.
The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the most effective framework
for the defense of Japan is close defense cooperation between the two countries.
This cooperation is based on a combination of appropriate defense capabilities for
the Self Defense Forces of Japan and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The
leaders again confirmed that U.S. deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security (of 1960) remains the guarantee for Japan's security. 19
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This is the widely believed view expressed by former Commander of the Marine Corps in Japan, Major
General Henry Stackpole, who stated blunUy that "If we were to pull out of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,
it would definitely be a destabilizing factor in Asia." Also expressed by President Reagan's first National
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As a result of this renewed cooperation agreed upon at the summit, the
governments of both nations completed a Defense Guidelines Review (DGR) released in
September 1997. 20 This review suggested a much larger role for the Japanese military in
promoting and preserving regional stability. The new self defense roles proposed in the
DGR report cover the following areas: participating in refugee relief and transfer
operations; helping the U.S. enforce naval blockades; inspecting foreign ships to enforce
sanctions; conducting search and rescue operations on the high seas; providing material
(except weapons and ammunition) and fuel to U.S. vessels and aircraft; permitting the
use of Japanese airfields by U.S. warplanes involved in conflict; engaging in enhanced
intelligence gathering and sharing; and providing other rear area support such as
maintenance, medical services, security, and communications. 21 These guidelines
provide an ample framework for the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) to work with,
but the implementation of these guidelines in practice may prove difficult for the
Japanese government. As has been the case since the end of World War JJ, the Japanese
constitution, namely Article IX, may inhibit the greater role that the U.S. is seeking for
Japan. Also, Japanese public opinion does not favor an increased role for the military in
the region. The Japanese public is quite content with the "solely defense" role the JSDF
has played since its creation. Both of these reasons, coupled with the pragmatist
approach of Japan's current political leaders, do not indicate that significant changes will
occur in the roles of the JSDF. The pragmatist approach of Hashimoto, current Prime
20
This was a review and update of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.
21
National Security Planning Associates, "Asia Pacific, Issues and Developments," (Cambridge, MA:
November 1997), V.
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Minister Obuchi, and other Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders involves trying to
steer clear of divisive debates over security and the constitution. These leaders are
sensitive to political winds and will adapt to prevailing public opinion. 22
The President and former Prime Minister also agreed that a continued U.S.
military presence is essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
The U.S. reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment
requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward-deployed
military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan.
23
These two
agreements are contradictory. On one hand, the U.S. is pushing for greater Japanese
involvement in regional security, while, on the other, maintaining the over abundance of
U.S. troops in the region. The results of this dichotomy, thus far, are stagnancy. The
asymmetrical nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance has not been altered in any fundamental
way by the agreements signed at the summit, despite comments in the Japanese and
American press hailing the results as "historic," "far-reaching," and "a landmark
moment."24
What was adopted at the summit was heavily influenced by a report put forward
by a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joseph Nye, known as the Nye Initiative.25
The Nye Initiative proffers that 100,000 troops are needed in the region for the following
reasons:
22
National Security Planning Associates, 4.
23
Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security.
24
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25
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Nye's office at the time, the Department of Defense Office of International Security Affairs, entitled
"United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region" in February 1995.
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1) The clear and present danger posed by North Korea.
2) To deter military expansion by the People's Republic of China (PRC).
3) To protect against a situation where countries in the region might feel pushed
to arm themselves against each other and against uncertainty.
4) To keep Asian economic markets open. 26
These reasons for the retention of the current level of troops are perpetuated in U.S.
policy making toward Japan. It will be argued in later chapters that these reasons are, in
fact, "strategic myths." These "myths" serve as justification for the U.S. to remain in a
Cold War posture years after the end of the Cold War. The fact that these stated reasons
for a continued American presence in the Asia Pacific region at such high levels are
debatable has lead analysts to search for other possible reasons.
Japan specialist Chalmers Johnson has argued that the U.S. troops remain
deployed in the region and in Japan especially, to be watchdogs. The real, but seldom
stated, reasons (for a continued presence) are a desire on the part of the American
government to keep an eye on Japan, thus preventing Japan from undertaking
international initiatives without consulting Washington, and reassuring the rest of Asia
that Japan will not rearm on its own.
27 Such a display of mistrust between the U.S. and
Japan can only be harmful to the proposed alliance for the next century. In the new world
order, Japan must be given regional responsibilities commensurate with her capabilities,
and the U.S. must trust Japan in fulfilling these responsibilities.
The Joint Declaration of Security states that implementation of desired policies
should be conducted with close coordination between the U.S., Japan, and China, as to
26
Johnson, Chalmers, "The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in Asia," Japan Policy
Research Institute Working Paper No. 16, February 16, 1996, 4-5.
27
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not alienate China and to alleviate their fears of Japanese militarism. To take this a step
further, perhaps the most effective arrangement in the region would be the development
of a collective security agreement, coupled with bilateral relationships, among all of the
nations of Northeast Asia. A Northeast Asia Treaty Organization (NEATO) would
include Japan, China, North and South Korea, Russia, Mongolia, and perhaps the U.S. as
a mediator, and serve to quell the concerns of the other nations over Japan's expanded
military role in maintaining the security of the region. Such an organization would give
each of the countries a forum from which to express their concerns on a level playing
field and make the transition into the next century smoother. In fact, attempts at the
organization of such groups have occurred28
,
and some such groups do exist at a "track
two" level. 29 The U.S. should continue to encourage such intiatives.
The Clinton-Hashimoto Summit represented a refreshing attempt by the two
countries to move beyond cold war politics. The resulting Joint Declaration and Defense
Guidelines have laid out the responsibilities for both nations in maintaining the peace and
prosperity of the Asia Pacific region. The real test now comes in the implementation of
these policies. The Japanese must overcome their historically embedded obstacles to
increasing their military role in maintaining regional security, including, if deemed
necessary, constitutional reform. The U.S. must ensure that Japan is held accountable for
the implementation of these collaborative policies. And both countries must ensure that
this transition is completed without alienating the other countries of the region. If history
28
South Korea has proposed a Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) composed of South and North
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29 The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the
Asian Pacific (CSCAP) represent two such groups.
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provides any lessons, one is that economic power - for example, the U.S. after 1919 —
cannot long evade the political and military responsibilities that follow. 30 Japan is such
an economic power today and must assume the responsibilities of one.
30
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III. MAKING OF U.S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD JAPAN
Prior to the signing of this agreement, a two-year long intensive review of the
political and security environment in the region was conducted by the governments of
both countries. The results of the summit can be attributed to this review which involved,
on the U.S. side, a combination of Congressional politics, bureaucratic influence, and
executive action.
It is the roles of these players in the making of U.S. foreign policy toward Japan
that are to be examined in this chapter. Namely, this chapter will analyze the ways in
which Congressional decision-making is influenced by both inside and outside forces in
the formulation of foreign policy and whether the best policy, in the case of Japan, has
been achieved by these processes.
A. CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS AND BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCES
Congressional decision-making on foreign policy is traditionally explained by
simple causal factors that fall under an electoral explanation. The electoral explanation
dictates that the things that motivate Congress members are the opinions of their
constituency and their desire for reelection. The electoral explanation of congressional
behavior can be broken into three sub-categories: extensive deference to the executive
administration, grandstanding, and specific attention to parochial matters. 31 Deference to
the administration most likely occurs on foreign policy issues that are not of great
importance or relevance to the general public. Thus, the members of Congress can do no
31
Lindsay, James M., Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (Baltimore and London: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1994), 34-38.
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better than to defer such policy decisions to the executive branch of an administration.
Grandstanding has developed in the modern age of media where politicians can gain
significant exposure in the press and on television by standing up for a particular cause in
foreign policy. Such exposure can prove beneficial to a politician's electoral aspirations.
Parochial concerns can influence Congressional decision-making when certain foreign
policies have a direct impact on the constituency of a politician. Such would be the case
if the constituency contains certain defense industries or contractors whose production
would be affected by foreign policy decisions. A combination of all three of these sub-
categories seems to have played a role, and continues to play a role, in the formulation of
U.S. foreign policy toward Japan.
This relatively simple electoral explanation of Congressional decision-making is
not sufficient to explain Congressional behavior though.
32 A Congress member's specific
ideologies and desire for "good policy and politics" also come into play in the making of
foreign policy. Also important is how the process of framing political issues influences
Congressional behavior. Framing constitutes a strategy through which key political and
bureaucratic elites attempt to convince the public and fellow elites of the validity of their
beliefs and supporting policy imperatives. 33 Congressional attitudes are invariably
influenced by a combination of the electoral explanation and the members' desires for
formulation of good policy and politics. But the process that ties these variables together
is framing. In the formulation of a foreign policy toward Japan leading to the Joint
32
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33
Ripley, Randal B. and Lindsay, James M., "How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy," in
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Press, 1993), 32-35.
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Declaration on Security, the framing of issues and development of certain strategic
beliefs and images played a substantial role.
1. Framing of the Issues
The Nye Initiative heavily influenced what was adopted at the Clinton-Hashimoto
Summit. The Nye Initiative proffers that 100,000 troops are needed in the Asia-Pacific
region to counter what has been labeled here as "strategic myths." Whether the threats of
these "strategic myths" (North Korea, China's military expansion, economic markets
closing, or an arms race among the region's nations if U.S. troops are removed) are
correct or exaggerated is arguable. U.S. policymakers are compelled to overstate the
dangers to American interests to mobilize domestic support for their policies. But,
regardless of the validity of these threats, these are some of the images and beliefs upon
which the Japan-U.S. security alliance is framed. These images and beliefs perpetuate
the desires of decision-makers to maintain the current force structure in Asia. Several
political elites unwaveringly accept and disseminate these views in Congressional
testimonies. Examples include Department of State Official Winston Lord, who stated
that "it would be a serious mistake to touch our troop levels," and Subcommittee on Asia
and the Pacific Chairman Doug Bereuter who has stated that "we are not going to cut
back our capability."35
Framing takes place in several ways, from published articles to influence the
general public to testimonies during Congressional hearings of the House Committee on
34
Johnson, Robert H., Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 131-132.
35 Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, "US-Japan Relations and American
Interests in Asia," One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, October 25, 1995, 18.
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International Relations and its various Sub-Committees. These testimonies have lasting
impacts on the Committee members and define the boundaries of the issues being
discussed. As Congressman Howard Berman, also on the Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific, stated to Nye during a hearing,
As a new member of this subcommittee back in January when you came to the
subcommittee, it was very helpful to me in getting a sense of what the discussion
was and what issues were involved in terms of security arrangements and forward
basing and the whole U.S.-Japan relationship. 36
In other words, Berman's views on the issues of U.S.-Japan security were shaped
substantially by Nye's perspectives.
Another example of framing the issues is testimony by Nye himself to the House
Committee on International Relations, where he testifies that
Critics who ignore the importance of security in the (Asia-Pacific) region are
like people who forget the importance of the oxygen they breathe. You tend not
to notice it until you begin to lose it. But once you begin to lose it, there is
nothing else you will think about.
37
It is through such means that political elites can shape issues in Congress and conjure
powerful images to influence the foreign policy decisions of the U.S. government. The
image of North Korea steamrollering over the 38th parallel or China's "red scare" are
some of the images upon which national security policy is developed. Nye's image
equating U.S. presence in the region to the oxygen we breathe was a lasting image that
undoubtedly had some effect on the policies that were chosen in the Asia-Pacific
36 Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, "US-Japan Relations and American
Interests in Asia," One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, October 25, 1995, 14.
37 Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, "The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in




But are these images accurate or are they simply ''strategic myths" used to
justify existing policy and the sustenance of forward-deployed troops for perhaps other,
more tangible, reasons?
2. The Myths
a. The DPRK Danger
Although the Korean peninsula is extremely unstable, the threats to
regional security posed by the North Koreans may not be as vast as perceived in
Congressional testimony. South Korea (ROK) currently has a 650,000 man army of its
own that can handle most threats from the North and the DPRK is an isolated and failing
communist country on the brink of starvation that would probably not be able to sustain
any prolonged conflict. In June 1994, well before the Nye report, the Japanese military
analyst Shunji Taoka concluded that the DPRK was producing only sixty percent of the
grain it needed and that there was a high probability it would collapse within three to five
years.
39 The 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in Korea and the majority of U.S. troops in
Japan (mainly those in Okinawa) are targeted against this diminishing threat. It can also
be argued that the sheer numbers of North Korean troops on or near the border would be
very difficult to stop initially. If Pyongyang chooses to act irrationally by launching a
desperate attack, no amount of military power can deter it. 40 That being the case, the
relatively limited 37,000 U.S. troops in Korea, whose stated purpose is to deter such
38
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action by the North Koreans, would serve as nothing but a speed bump for the North
Korean troops until U.S. and Korean reinforcements could arrive on station. Deterrence
assumes reasonable judgment by the enemy. 41 Reasonable judgment by the North
Korean regime is not something to base a strategy upon. The question that needs to be
addressed in Congressional hearings is, "are these forward deployed troops really
necessary?"
b. PRC Military Expansion
China's military expansion is already taking place while we have troops
forward deployed to the region. China's defense spending has increased dramatically in
the 1980s and 1990s. China's military modernization has included acquisition of weapon
systems that boost the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) capability to project power
beyond China's shores - Russian Su-27s, Russian Kilo class submarines, in-flight
refueling technology, and a continuing interest in buying or building one or more aircraft
carriers.
42
It has been argued that China's increased military spending is simply a result
of their improved economic situation over the past couple of decades and their desire to
climb the international stature ladder. Whether China's military expansion and
modernization will prove effective remains to be seen, but the maintenance of U.S. troops
in the region has historically done little to deter Chinese military expansion. Also, the
Weinberger Doctrine still exists in American military policy, which states that the U.S.
will not use force in international relations without specifying the endgame and an exit
strategy. In dealing with the world's largest social system, the Weinberger Doctrine
41 Hosokawa, 3.
42
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essentially means that the U.S. would never use ground forces against China. Therefore,
a logical policy would be to withdraw all ground forces from East Asia, which are both a
source of instability in relations with the host nations (as the Okinawan rape of
September 1995 has demonstrated) and a provocation to the Chinese, while strengthening
American sea power in the Pacific. 43 These logical assumptions are excluded by elites
and policy-makers in Congressional hearings in deference to the more powerful image of
a "China in arms."
c. U.S. Troops Keep Asian Markets Open
The notion that the presence of U.S. troops in Asia is necessary to keep the
Asian markets open is also susceptible to closer evaluation. Nye testified to Congress
that among the most important reasons for East Asia's economic successes are American
alliances in the region and the continued presence of substantial U.S. forces. 44 While the
alliances are obviously crucial, the role that forward-deployed troops played in Asia's
economic development are less apparent. It has been global economic interdependence
that developed and strengthened Asian markets, not the presence of American troops in
the region. East Asian markets will not open wider to U.S. goods and services because of
the presence of the Seventh Fleet.
45
It must be noted though that the current economic
crisis in Asia has narrowed the markets for American goods, and especially American
military equipment. The future may see a tighter market for American goods as the
countries of the region strive to overcome this economic crisis by turning inward and
43
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purchasing less foreign goods. But the correlation between Asian economic markets and
U.S. military presence in Asia is hardly discernible.46
d. It Costs Less To Station Troops In Japan Than It Would To Keep
Them At Home
This statement was also professed by Nye to the House Committee on
International Relations.
47 While it is true that Japan is the United States' most generous
partner in providing host nation support, up to six billion dollars annually, Johnson would
argue that it is not necessarily cheaper to keep the troops in Japan. The cost of America's
East Asian obligations is nearly forty billion dollars a year. 48 Since most of the Japanese
funds actually go toward salaries of Japanese employees of the American forces, local
construction costs, utilities, and rents for confiscated lands, Johnson argues that basing
the 47,000 U.S. troops currently in Japan in the United States would save more than the
six billion dollars paid by the government of Japan and also contribute greatly to the
economies of states that have suffered from base closures.49 Opportunity costs, such as
the money spent by troops off base, obviously benefit the hosts of these troops, and must
be considered when analyzing the total costs where to station these troops.
46 Chalmers Johnson argues that Nye's statement that American troops helped to keep Asian markets open
is contradictory because it implies that if we did not have troops in Asia, then the American annual $100
billion deficit in trade with Asia might be even larger, in "The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the
Cold War in Asia," 5.
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B. WHY MYTHS ARE PERPETUATED IN CONGRESS
Congress has established itself as a mainstay in the formulation of foreign policy.
It has done so largely through the democratization of Congress and the expansion of the
various committees, sub-committees, and staffs that now participate in foreign policy
analysis. Through hearings of these committees and sub-committees, prominent scholars,
businessmen, and Department of Defense officials can present their views on certain
policy issues.
Qualified individuals holding no official position in the government can be
invited to speak on the record in Congressional hearings and to provide data to
individual Congressmen or memoranda for particular committees. . .It is precisely
because Congress is a political body of representatives elected through partisan
processes, with an explicit majority-minority partisan structure in its committees,
that the intellectual and informational resources available outside the government
have at least a chance of being brought to bear.50
Why is it then, with the abundance of resources available for analysis, that these "myths"
were allowed to be perpetuated in the Congressional analysis of U.S. foreign policy
toward Japan prior to the signing of the Joint Declaration on Security? One reason might
be that the various committees and sub-committees contributed to the framing of these
issues by inviting primarily outside specialists in favor of the Nye Initiative to testify in
hearings, including Nye himself. 51 Proponents of restructuring the U.S. forward presence
50 Committee for Economic Development, Congressional Decision-Makingfor National Security (New
York: Committee for Economic Development, 1974), 21.
51 Of the six hearings of the House Committee on International Relations analyzed (Feb 2 and 9, Mar 16,
Jun 27, Oct 25 and 30, 1995) during the formative period of the new Joint Declaration on Security, only
one speaker (of eight), Dr. Kenneth Pyle of the National Bureau of Asian Research, opposed the current
forward presence structure in Asia. He cited that "the US playing a role akin to mercenaries does suit the
national character of the Americans nor does a dependency role square with Japanese national traditions."
All of the other speakers took the 100,000 troop level as a given. Hearings of the Committee since the
signing of the Joint Declaration have included numerous speakers opposed to the fixed troop level in Asia.
This argument is hampered now by the fact now that the Joint Declaration on Security represents a U.S.
promise to maintain current troop levels in the region and to renege on that promise now would reduce the
trust between the two countries. The argument is that the time to have the discussions about troop levels
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would not be as quick to accept the aforementioned "strategic myths." Thus, these
"strategic myths" that the Nye Initiative proffers were strengthened as a result of these
congressional hearings.
Another possible reason for decision-makers' acquiescence to existing security
arrangements with Japan may be explained by parochial concerns. Under existing
security arrangements, Japan is one of America's biggest customers for weapons. Japan
buys large amounts of military equipment and services from the U.S. every year.
Interoperability of major systems, purchased directly or license built, is a major aspect of
the Japan-U.S. security relationship.
52 The list of U.S. equipment in the Japanese
inventory includes Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, Patriot
missile batteries, AEGIS missile systems for destroyers, F-15 fighter aircraft, P-3
maritime patrol aircraft, C-130 cargo planes, and SH-60 helicopters. It can be argued that
many in the Pentagon's "lucrative trade agency"53 may want to see the current security
relationship with Japan continue to sustain the influx of Japanese capital for these
weapons systems. The United States is actively promoting arms sales throughout the
region while claiming that its forces are there to minimize the threat of armed conflict.
This dichotomy only adds to the potential instability in the Asia Pacific region.
was before the Treaty was signed, not now. The current arguments, though, are certainly a step in the right
direction.
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A third reason why the myths are continued has to do with electoral politics.
Robert A. Pastor argues that the main purpose of Congress-dominant foreign policies is
to send signals to three groups: to constituents to show that their Congressman has heard
their complaints, to the administration to pursue a particular interest more vigorously, or
to a foreign government to correct a particular problem, whether it is a closed market or a
closed political system.
54 The current situation in Northeast Asia does not satisfy any of
these three requisites and, thus, does not merit greater Congressional action on foreign
policy-making in that region. Comparatively, there was a lot more public attention paid
to Latin American areas such as Panama or Nicaragua in the 1980s due to various human
rights violations and the press coverage of such. Thus, Congressional action was
necessary to appease respective constituencies. In Asia in the 1990s, there is not a great
public outcry over the removal or restructuring of U.S. troops other than arguments made
in academia. Congressmen are not obligated by electoral concerns, nor by grandstanding
or maintaining partisan lines, into taking any given action and are able to accept the
"strategic myths" and the status quo in the region.
C. SUMMARY
The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security signed at the Clinton-Hashimoto
Summit was the result of two years of both governments conducting an intensive review
of the evolving political and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. The main
tenet of this new security agreement is the maintenance of the current level of U.S. troops
forward deployed to the region. It is rather apparent why the Japanese government would
54
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readily accept such a situation. Their remarkable economic growth over the past four
decades was due, in no small part, to the fact that they were able to minimize their
defense expenditures while covered under the U.S. military umbrella. That is to say, they
were enjoying their "free ride." The reasons for U.S. persistence in maintaining current
forward deployed troop levels are not as apparent. The foreign policy adopted toward
Japan combines a combination of approaches.
Congress certainly plays a dominant role in modern day decision-making in
foreign policy. In the case of Japan, these decisions have been influenced by much more
than just a simple electoral explanation. The framing of certain issues and the creation of
strategic myths concerning the region have been very influential in the development of
the revised Japan-U.S. alliance. The result is a policy that limits drastic change from the
pre-existing cold war strategies in the region. This resistance to change in the region may
prove counterproductive to the goals that the U.S. is promoting in the region, namely
stability and prosperity. Policy makers need to move beyond the strategic myths and
traditional ideologies that greatly influence today's decision-making and develop
strategies that will truly last into the next century.
The tenets of the Joint Declaration on Security can offer a promising relationship
between the U.S. and Japan in the next century. U.S. policy toward the region, though,
does seem to still have remnants of cold war strategy. What is needed at the U.S.
strategic level is an in-depth analysis on the cost effectiveness of forward deployment, the
actual number of troops necessary in the region to satisfy U.S. objectives, and the actual
34
roles that these troops play in the region. It is the role of the government, Congress and
bureaucracy both, to instigate such investigations.
35
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IV. FACTORS IN JAPAN AFFECTING THE ALLIANCE
Having examined how the security relationship between the U.S. and Japan was
formulated and described how policymakers in the U.S. view this alliance, it is vital to
analyze the factors that are calling for a change to this relationship. These factors include
public opinion in both Japan and the U.S., and economic concerns. These concerns are
amplified in Okinawa, where the largest concentrations of U.S. personnel in Japan are
stationed.
A. PUBLIC OPINION
A recent public opinion poll in Japan shows that although 70% of those polled
favor the U.S.-Japan alliance, 67% want the U.S. bases in Japan reduced or removed.55
There also seem to be misperceptions in both countries as to why the U.S. troops are
actually stationed in Japan.
The Japanese public tends to perceive the U.S. bases in Japan as relics left over
from the post-World War JJ occupation era. They have persisted for more than
fifty years only because of the Cold War. The U.S. public, on the other hand,
tends to feel that the U.S. is doing Japan a favor by stationing troops there and
protecting Japan. Since both Japanese and American perceptions have some truth
to them, the gap between them could undermine the alliance. In order to ensure
that the alliance retains the approval of both the Japanese and the American
people, it is necessary to reduce the burdens on both sides and to avoid friction as
much as possible.56
There are factions within both countries that wish to see this relationship altered, namely
in the shape of a restructuring of the U.S. forward-stationed troops.
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Nowhere is this more evident than on Okinawa, where 26,000 of the 47,000
troops in Japan are stationed and public opinion is almost unanimously in favor of
removing U.S. bases. The rape of a twelve-year-old girl by three American servicemen
in 1995 has made the removal of U.S. troops from Japan's southern island a major
political debate and brought into question why U.S. troops still remain in Asia years after
the end of the Cold War. The Okinawan rape incident is not exactly an isolated incident
either. Since the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese rule in 1972, U.S. servicemen have
committed more than a crime a day on the southern Japanese island. 57 Acts of violence
by U.S. troops on the island happen far too often to be overlooked or accepted as random
occurrences. The frequency of these crimes committed by U.S. personnel have left a city
councilwoman from Naha City, Okinawa wondering how many more times the U.S.
Ambassador to Japan would have to say he was sorry for the behavior of U.S. troops on
the island.
58
There are several other reasons why the Okinawans would like to see the
Americans off of the island. Okinawa lags behind mainland Japan in economic
development. The per capita income on Okinawa is only 75% of that of all of Japan and
the unemployment rate on the island is twice that of the rest of the country. Okinawans
blame these shortfalls on the presence of U.S. bases. The 39 American facilities on the
island cover 20% of the total area of Okinawa. Most of these facilities are concentrated
in the densely populated central and southern parts of the island. The presence of the
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bases in these areas makes urban development impossible.59 Thus the island is deprived
of the industrial infrastructure necessary for economic development. Also, unlike the
U.S. bases in the rest of Japan, which are on state-owned property, 30% of the bases in
Okinawa are on privately owned property. The owners of this property are essentially
forced into leasing this land to the U.S. government. This fact obviously breeds the
discontent that many Okinawans feel toward the U.S. presence. The U.S.-Japan Special
Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), established in November 1995 by both of the
governments, has concluded that the U.S. will close or downsize eleven of the military
installations on Okinawa and return to Japan approximately twenty percent of the land
now occupied by U.S. forces. Although this is a step in the right direction, and will
relieve some of the aforementioned burdens on the Okinawans, the plan does not call for
a reduction of the troop sizes on the island. Rather, it just represents shifting troops, and
the problems associated with them, to other parts of the island.
Waning public support in the United States could also have an impact on the
future of the U.S. presence in the region. The U.S. cannot long sustain a commitment
without the support of the public, and close consultations with Congress are important in
this effort.
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It was easier to convince the public of the benefits of forward deployment
when there was a large, generally understood, threat. In the post-Cold War era, the threat
is not so clear, especially in the Asia Pacific region, thus it is harder to sell Americans on
keeping 100,000 troops in the Asia Pacific region. As Americans struggle with crime,
drugs, poverty, healthcare, and other pressing concerns, convincing them that American
59 Taken from Governor Ota's testimony to the Japanese Supreme Court on July 10, 1996.
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troops should remain in Asia to protect wealthy Japanese and Koreans from an
ambiguous threat, or even worse, Asians from the Japanese, will become more difficult. 61
B. ECONOMIC CONCERNS
The largest of economic concerns has to due with the Host Nation Support (HNS)
that the government of Japan provides to the U.S. to keep the troops on Japanese soil.
Japan is by far the largest contributor of HNS to the U.S. in the world, providing nearly
six billion dollars annually. The second leading contributor, Korea, is a distant second,
providing roughly 290 million dollars, while Germany provides only 80 million dollars.
The current financial crisis in Japan and the rest of Asia is directly affecting the Japanese
government's ability to finance its support of the U.S. forces in Japan.
62 The current
arrangement, negotiated under a Special Measures Agreement of 1995, commits Japanese
HNS through the end of fiscal year 2001 (March 2002). Beyond then, it is unclear that
the Japanese will be able to, or will desire to, continue such support. This burden (HNS)
to Japanese taxpayers hangs like a darkening cloud over the future of the alliance.
Although substantive, Japan's HNS actually pays only a small fraction of the total
cost of the U.S. security commitment to Japan.64 The actual cost of America's East Asian
security commitments, in the estimate of the CATO Institute65 , is just under 40 billion
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dollars annually. To measure the total cost, it is necessary to consider not only the
expenses of the forces stationed in Japan and Korea but also that of the air, ground, and
naval units that exist to reinforce the forward-deployed forces if trouble breaks out in the
region.
66
In the post-Cold War era of American politics, resources are extremely limited,
and the defense budget has been the target of many reductions. When looking for
downsizing options, the U.S. government should consider restructuring its defense
strategy and its forward-stationed troops. The costs of moving these forward-stationed
troops to other, U.S., areas could be substantial as well. In the long term, though, these
costs would balance out, as it would cost less to operate these troops from the U.S. or
from U.S. territories. Also, there is a belief that the Japanese government would pay
some of the costs of moving these troops elsewhere. According to Japanese journalist
Shunji Taoka, who specializes in military affairs, there is no question that there would be
strong public support in Japan for its government to finance the cost of troop movements
and construction of necessary facilities in Hawaii or Guam to support these troop
movements.
67
In other words, the Japanese government might be willing to make the
short term financial commitments to reduce its long-term financial burdens.
It is clear that the status quo of U.S. presence in the Asia Pacific region can not
last. The Japanese no longer desire such presence, and the Americans will not be able to
afford it in the long run. The time for the U.S. to look at restructuring its forward
presence is now, when Americans have the capability to shape the environment in ways
amenable to the concerns of the United States throughout the next century.
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V. SUGGESTED FORWARD-STATIONED TROOP STRUCTURE
A. U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY IN EAST ASIA
The U.S. National Security Strategy states that forward stationing of military
forces in foreign territories serves to promote regional stability, deter aggression and
coercion among the region's players, prevent and reduce conflicts and threats, and serve
as role models for militaries in emerging democracies. 68 In the post-Cold War era, U.S.
resources available for commitment to overseas stations are finite. Therefore, it must be
questioned whether or not the U.S. can satisfy its security objectives with means other
than the forward stationing of troops in foreign territories. The U.S. ability to deter
potential adversaries in peacetime depends on several factors, particularly on our
demonstrated will and ability to uphold our security commitments when they are
challenged.
69 The U.S. can continue to demonstrate its will and ability to meet security
commitments overseas with forces stationed primarily in the U.S. and its territories.
These options need to be explored by U.S. policy makers.
As previously discussed, East Asia is an area that is ripe for such exploration.
Recent events, however, contradict such thinking. Former Prime Minister Hosokawa has
stated that the basic thrust in the Nye report on East Asian security that we can put Japan-
U.S. security ties back on track with minor adjustments is misguided. 70 What is needed is
a redefinition of the alliance that would include a massive restructuring of the forward-
deployed U.S troops in East Asia. This restructuring should be centered on a naval
68 A National Security Strategyfor a New Century (The White House, May 1997), 8.
69 A National Security Strategyfor a New Century, 9.
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strategy for the United States. It is the goal of this chapter to show that the U.S. can
relocate its ground and air forces in East Asia, and rely on its' naval presence to
accomplish its security goals. 71 Such restructuring done hastily could increase the level
of instability in the region. Thus, this restructuring of the U.S. forward presence needs to
be done with the utmost cooperation and participation of the region's countries. Such
transparency and dialogue could serve to allay the historical suspicions that East Asian
countries have of each other.
B. U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE IN EAST ASIA
Established in 1957, U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ), with its U.S. Army, U.S. Air
Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps elements, consists of about 47,000 personnel.
U.S. Forces are stationed in Japan pursuant to the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security of I960. 72 Under Article V of this treaty, the U.S. forces' areas
of responsibility are the land areas of the Japanese archipelago and the adjoining sea
areas out to twelve nautical miles. Under Article VI of the same treaty, the U.S. is given
use of Japanese facilities for maintaining regional security. U.S. forces are dispersed
among 91 facilities on Honshu, Kyushu, and Okinawa covering approximately 78,000
acres. Almost three-quarters of these facilities are located on Okinawa, covering nearly
twenty percent of the entire landmass of the small southern island.
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It is understood that U.S. ground and air troops have historically provided a regional balance to those of
China and Korea, acting as a substitute for such Japanese forces. With a withdrawal of U.S. ground and air
troops, it could reasonably be possible that Japan would have to expand its forces to maintain this regional
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U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) is a joint headquarters through which American
combat forces would be sent to the Combined Forces Command (CFC), an integrated
headquarters established by the governments of the U.S. and Korea in 1978. The USFK
is comprised of approximately 37,000 American personnel. Its elements include a large
Eighth U.S. Army command (27,500 personnel), a relatively large Seventh Air Force
(8,300 personnel), and a tiny naval element.
73
The U.S. legal obligations are those under
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolutions of 1950, by which the U.S. leads the
U.N. command, and the ROK-U.S. Mutual Security Agreement of 1954, which commits
both nations to assist each other in case of an outside attack. The CFC, which has always
been under the command of an American general, is responsible for planning the defense
of the ROK and, if necessary, directing the ROK-U.S. combined combat forces to defeat
enemy aggression.
C. U.S. TROOP REDUCTION?
With an expanded military role for Japan in the region, the U.S. would be able to
reduce its force structure there. The U.S. reluctance to do so is a reversion to cold war
politics. The fundamental reason for obfuscation seems to be nervousness about change
on the part of both governments. 74 The CATO Institute recommends that the U.S.
redeploy approximately half of its air and naval units now stationed in Japan to Guam
and other U.S. territories in the Central Pacific and demobilize the rest. 75 There are
several reasons why the U.S. should take the initiative in drawing down their troop
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strengths in the Asia Pacific region. Two of these have previously been discussed, the
shifting public opinion in both countries on issues related to forward stationing and the
economic concerns of both countries and Japan's current economic crisis. Other reasons
include the fact that the changing world order has modified the missions of these
forward-deployed troops and the fact there are just too many troops forward-stationed in
Japan.
1. Changing Mission
The forward-deployed troops in East Asia came about as a result of the Cold War
and the bipolar world that existed for the four decades of the Cold War. The Cold War
gave the forward stationing of U.S. troops in East Asia a certain justification. Forward
presence was necessary to deter and contain communist aggression from the Soviet
Union. The Cold War American-devised system of bilateral security alliances in the
Pacific region, coupled with the forward deployment of substantial American military
personnel and material, was an effective response to Washington's assessment of the
danger of Soviet expansionism. These forward-deployed troops contained Soviet
expansion and aided in maintaining relative peace and prosperity in the Asia Pacific
region. The American ability to maintain such a posture, due, in large part, to the
positive effects that Asia's economic boom in the 1980s had on the American economy,
also played a large role in the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.
In the post-Cold War era, this justification for maintaining military presence in
the region diminishes. The centrality of forward deployment in the U.S. East Asian
foreign policy may be untenable in the long run. Without the monolithic Soviet Union to
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threaten their very existence, the host countries may begin to question the purpose of the
American troops permanently stationed on their soil. The stated threats in U.S. foreign
policy are as mentioned above, in the Nye report. The underlying motives may be to
keep an eye on Japan and appease the fears of the region's other countries about a
remilitarization of Japan. Although these reasons are important in showing the countries
of the region that the United States intends to remain engaged, it seems that there are
more efficient and cost-effective ways to accomplish the same goals. The questions are,
then, whether these threats are important enough in American foreign policy to maintain
the current levels of forward-deployed troops, and how long will these troops need to
remain in the region. It must also be determined if there are better ways to accomplish
the same goals that will be supportable well into the next century. It is difficult to justify
preserving expensive and dangerous commitments indefinitely merely to spare Japan and
its neighbors the difficulties of confronting and overcoming old animosities. 76
2. Too Many Troops in Japan
The United States currently deploys approximately 16,500 marines on Okinawa.
The assumed role of these forces is to be within the region to deter any aggressive action
by North Korea. The Pentagon fears that any reduction of these forces would send the
wrong signal to the North Koreans about American intentions in the region. But the fact
is that the United States Navy does not have in-theater sealift capacity to move all of the
Marine units from Okinawa to "real forward areas" anyway. If other U.S. Marine or
Army units were using the limited amphibious and airlift capacity for an emergency in
76
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Korea or the Middle East, most of the Marines in Okinawa would be temporarily
stranded there as troops in exile.
77
This being the case, it would make sense, and satisfy
the concerns of many of the Okinawans, to relocate these Marines to other areas in the
Pacific, namely Hawaii or Guam, where they could be coupled with the sealift capability
to complete their assigned missions.
D. LIMITED FORWARD DEPLOYMENT/POWER PROJECTION
The United States insistence on forward stationing of troops in Asia has limited
the United States' flexibility in an era of uncertainty where flexibility should become the
Pentagon's primary goal. It is not the goal of this paper to argue for a return to American
isolationism, for American presence and commitment are vital to security in the Asia
Pacific region. Rather, this paper argues that this presence might better be served with a
strategy of power projection, or limited forward deployment. The centerpiece of such a
power projection strategy would be the forward deployed naval forces. What is needed
within this limited deployment strategy is a systematic and slow withdrawal of the
ground forces and air forces, first from Okinawa, and then from mainland Japan. This
would be done with ample notice to, and coordination with, the region's players to
prevent the potential panic that could be caused by a reduction in American forward-
deployed troop structure. These troops could be relocated within the Pacific area of
responsibility, but in American territories, such as Hawaii or Guam. Power projection
strategy entails a reordering of priorities toward the attainment of a genuine ability to
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expeditiously deploy tailored force packages from home bases to potential areas of crisis
or impending conflict. 78 Future restructuring could also include a gradual
"Koreanization" of Korea's defense. Such a restructuring does not call for a drastic
reduction of American presence in the Asia Pacific region, though, as a new relationship
should focus on continued training and exercises in the region and continued access to
certain facilities in the region.
1. Limited Flexibility
The present international security environment presents the U.S. with much
uncertainty. There is not one single discernible major threat; thus American forces need
to be tailored to counter a wide realm of existing and potential threats to their security
and prosperity. Forward stationing of large numbers of American troops somewhat limits
the flexibility that is needed in the present security environment. Implementing a concept
of power projection rather than forward stationing could provide U.S. strategic planners
with increased flexibility. Today's United States Army has only ten divisions, one of
which is tied down in Korea, leaving only nine available for contingencies. The Marine
Corps division in Okinawa, one of three in the Marine Corps, is also tied down even
though battalions often go afloat to train elsewhere in Asia. Tying these forces to specific
geographic concerns in East Asia limits their flexibility in responding to other
contingencies within and outside of the Asia Pacific region. A concept of power
projection rather than forward stationing would still allow these forces to respond to a
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Korean conflict, albeit not in as timely a manner
79
, as well as allow them to respond to
other contingencies.
2. Relocation of Ground and Air Forces
Key to this concept of limited forward deployment and power projection is the
relocation of the Marine Corps units in Okinawa and the Air Force units in Okinawa and
mainland Japan to either Hawaii or Guam. Taoka argues that, although he supports the
military and political alliance between the U.S. and Japan, the deployment of Marines in
Japan is no longer necessary and has become, in fact, harmful to the alliance. 80 This is
also the position taken by the Democratic Party of Japan (the major opposition party),
and former Prime Minister Hosokawa. On strategic and logistical grounds, there is also
high level opposition within the Marine Corps to the continued stationing of the Marines
in Okinawa. 81 The feeling is that they no longer have a mission there. The necessity of
U.S. ground troops is essentially being challenged, even with uncertainties dogging both
the Korean peninsula and China. 82
With the relocation of the Okinawa Marines, the U.S. Navy's Amphibious
Readiness Group (ARG), stationed in Sasebo, and the various Marine Corps air assets
could follow. The ARG and the air assets should also be relocated to wherever the
Marines are located, as their primary mission is support of these Marines. The most
logical relocation site for the Marine Corps Division, the ARG, and the Marine Corps air
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wing would be to Hawaii. The Marine Corps III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
stationed in Okinawa could be combined with III MEF Forces Hawaii at Kaneohe Bay,
Hawaii. Under the Hawaii Military Land Use Master Plan, the Marine Corps is planned
to be given over a 1000 acres on Bellows Air Force Base in Hawaii by October 1999 for
amphibious training purposes. 83 This land could also be used to ease the combining of
the two commands. Hawaii also has the military facilities to accommodate the ARG and
Marine Corps air assets. These Marine Corps units would still be available to participate
in exercises and real-world contingencies in Asia when necessary, and could do so on a
rotational deployment basis. Also, their presence in Hawaii would give the Hawaiian
economy a needed boost, as would any government construction that may be necessary to
accommodate the relocated Marines.
It would seem reasonable, as well, that the Air Force units stationed in Okinawa
and mainland Japan could project their power just as potently in the Asia Pacific region
from Guam and Hawaii. In fact, Anderson Air Force Base on Guam has been the
prepositioning base of choice for the most recent Air Force demonstrations of power
projection. It is unclear whether the Japanese government would allow the use of the
Japanese air bases for anything other than the protection of Japan. Under protocols of the
1960 Mutual Security Treaty, the United States must ask the Japanese government in a
"prior consultation" to use U.S. bases on Japanese territory for any direct act of war
outside of Japan. This being the case, it would not deteriorate the power projection
capability of the U.S. Air Force greatly by relocating the Air Force units currently
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stationed in Japan to Guam and Hawaii. These Air Force units in Japan include one
fighter wing, one multi-mission wing, and one airlift wing. They could be coupled with
the existing air base wing in Guam or the existing air base wing in Hawaii and still flex
their power projection capabilities.
The Air Force seems to be reshaping its forces in the post-Cold War era to meet
such power projection capabilities. In a recent message to the force, Air Force Chief of
Staff, General Michael Ryan, suggested a thorough overhaul of the very structure and
operations concept of the post-Cold War Air Force. 84 Instead of focusing on a "big war"
by sending large numbers of U.S. warplanes to well-stocked allied bases overseas, the
new plans call for a leaner force that must respond quickly to crises in austere
environments - and sometimes stay for long periods of time. 85 Such leaner forces would
give the Air Force the flexibility they would need for deterrence in the future security
environment and support their relocation from Japan to U.S. territories.
3. Continued Naval Presence
To continue to meet their national security goals of continued engagement with
the countries of Northeast Asia and to maintain stability and prosperity into the next
century, the U.S. should rely on its forward-deployed naval assets. In a study conducted
by Robert Looney, David Schrady, and Ronald Brown to determine the economic
benefits derived from forward-engaged naval forces, they postulated that:
Crises tend to have a negative impact on markets and economic activity.
Forward-engaged naval forces are often the first to respond to a crisis and their
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being on scene usually has a stabilizing political influence. The stabilizing
influence extends to economic activity as well. 86
Naval forces, due to their ability to react to a wide array of contingencies in a timely
manner, provide a flexibility that ground and air forces can not. While ground and air
forces have needs to operate in an adversary's territorial or air space, naval assets can
complete missions from the sea, an international arena. Thus, naval forces remain the
first forces to respond to international crises and it makes sense to keep naval forces
forward-deployed to maintain the stabilizing political influence that power projection
yields.
The maintenance of the Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) in Yokosuka,
Japan represents the most cost effective and efficient way for the United States to remain
militarily engaged with Japan and the other countries of the region. The current binding
agreements between Japan and the U.S., including that of HNS and the Status of Forces
Agreement, could remain applicable with the maintenance of the naval forces in Japan.
Substantial support forces for the FDNF would need to remain in place, but the relocation
of the U.S. ground and air forces from Japan would foster the Japanese for a level of
HNS that they would be more willing to contend with. The U.S. would then be able to
use these naval forces for crisis response within the region, and, if necessary, neighboring
regions, to continue to show that they are committed to stability in the Asia Pacific
region. Even in the absence of foreseeable threats, naval forward engagement improves
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our chances of deterring aggression, and of forestalling escalation and preserving our
political options, should deterrence fail.
4. Koreanization of Korean Defense
Future restructuring of U.S. troops in the Asia Pacific region could also be aided
by a gradual Koreanization of South Korea's defense. Attempts at peace talks between
the two Koreas have failed to even get started because of the DPRK's insistence on one
major concession: the withdrawal or reduction of U.S. troops in Korea. Quotes ^>uch as
"North Korea threatened to withdraw from peace talks for the Korean peninsula because
the U.S. refused to consider discussion of an American troop withdrawal from South
Korea" have become commonplace during attempted Korean peace talks. To get the
peace talks started, the U.S. should consider discussing a plan for reduction or removal of
U.S. troops in Korea.
The biggest threat to the DPRK is the ROK-U.S. alliance, even though the U.S.
and ROK would never launch a war against the DPRK because they both know that such
a war would be too costly and produce no significant gain. Under present military
circumstances, the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), backed up by U.S.
reinforcements, would win any mid- to high-intensity conflict in 120 days or less - but
Seoul would be substantially destroyed in the first few days. 89 Current policy concedes
that if the North decided to attack, the CFC could not stop them initially. The
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Commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, Admiral Joseph Prueher, acknowledges that,
although the North is too weak to sustain an invasion of the South, if the North decided to
attack, hundreds of thousands (of South Koreans and Americans) would likely be killed. 90
This being the case, why have U.S. troops there at all? The current force structure on the
peninsula is massive. DPRK has a reported 1.1 million personnel in uniform, while the
ROK military numbers 650,000. The 37,000 U.S. troops in Korea pale in comparison to
these huge armies. In fact, the U.S. presence in Korea makes up about only two percent
of the total force structure in the two Koreas. The withdrawal or reduction in U.S. troops,
or at least the willingness to discuss the issue by the U.S., could serve as a catalyst to get
the inter-Korean peace talks started. The refusal by the U.S. to even discuss such
possibilities indicates the dominance of Cold War thinking in U.S. foreign policy toward
the Koreas.
The U.S. also continually overestimates the military threat of North Korea to
justify the existence of troops in the South. Many analysts feel that North Korea, which
lacks a strong industrial base and is rapidly losing the ability to feed and clothe its people,
has the capacity to mount a full-scale war against the combined forces of the U.S. and
South Korea. 91 It is apparent and mandated under the Mutual Defense Treaty that any
DPRK aggression would be met by the movement of additional U.S. forces to the region.
The U.S. has the capability to provide such forces even if the troops in South Korea are
removed. Thus, if their removal could have sweeping ramifications in inter-Korean
dialogue, then the U.S. should explore such options.
90
Matthews, William, "Prueher Sees Eased Threat in Asia," Navy Times, November 9, 1998, 4.
91
Shorrock, Tim "Korea: New Korea Policy Needed." [www.kimsoft.com/1997/US-polic.html].
55
It is obviously still quite urgent that a system of rapid response to DPRK's threats
should remain on the Korean peninsula, an area that has a very short early warning time
and a shallow battlefield. But the U.S. should transfer these responsibilities of rapid
response to the ROK forces. The ROK forces are already seen as technologically
superior to those of the DPRK, and further developments in that area will continue to act
as a deterrent to North Korean aggression. The U.S. should, therefore, in compliance
with Article II of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty which encourages "self-help" in
deterrence of threats, and with the establishment of the CFC which does not specify that
the Commander must be an American, give the command of the CFC to the ROK forces
and allow them to absorb greater duties in their own country. This Koreanization of
Korean defense could allow the U.S. to reduce its military presence on the peninsula.
5. Continued Engagement
If the U.S. were to undertake such a restructuring of their forward deployed
posture, there would be a need for the U.S. to remain engaged in two ways: continued
exercises with the countries of the region and ensured access to military facilities in the
host countries when needed. It would remain to be seen whether or not the countries,
namely Japan and Korea, would desire to continue annual exercises in the future if the
U.S. withdraws air and ground troops. It seems likely, though, that these countries would
continue to have much to gain from continued cooperation and participation with U.S.
forces in such an environment. Continued training with the world's most potent military
power could only improve the capabilities of those countries that choose to do so, not to
mention fine tune the operational abilities of multinational forces. Future exercises could
56
possibly include the emerging military of China as well, as recent port visits to Chinese
ports by U.S. Navy ships might indicate a potential for future engagement with the
People's Liberation Army. Also, a recent visit to the Pentagon by General Zhang
Wannian, the Vice Chairman of China's Central Military Committee, served to boost the
trust between China and the U.S. and to deepen and advance the military relationships
between the two countries.92
Ensured access to military facilities in the region in times of crisis would make it
easier for the U.S. to make such a transition. But the host countries might not be so quick
to give such support. This is something that should be negotiated on paper with Japan
and Korea prior to the removal of any U.S. troops from the region. A new and more
appropriate American defense policy toward East Asia would stress access to the area
rather than fixed bases.
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VI. REGIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING ALLIANCES AND
MULTILATERALISM
Having proposed such a restructuring, it is now important to analyze some of the
major obstacles that need to be overcome to make it come about. The largest
impediments to reducing U.S. presence in East Asia are the strategic concerns of each of
the countries in the region. It is widely believed that if the Americans reduce their
presence in Asia, then a power vacuum would be created in the region. It is believed that
this power vacuum will then cause an accelerated arms race among the region's
countries. Added to these concerns is the fear of resurgent Japanese militarism by the
countries that shared the brunt of Japanese aggression in the first half of the twentieth
century, namely China and Korea, and by the United States. The way to help overcome
these obstacles is through security and confidence-building measures that can be
produced with multilateralism.
A. STRATEGIC CONCERNS
The post-Cold War environment in Asia represents a dichotomy. While the great
powers of the region (China, Japan, U.S., Russia, and perhaps Korea) all seem to be co-
existing peacefully, the dangers of instability remain in the region. It can be argued that
all of the great powers in Asia have common interests in maintaining a stable, nuclear-
free Korean peninsula and economic recovery in the region leading to a renewed
economic prosperity. But even while these powers have common interests which
currently create a relatively benign security atmosphere in Asia, this atmosphere is
fragile. The Japanese are perhaps more concerned about the unpredictability of this




In fact, the potential sources of Northeast Asian conflicts are plentiful, and
at a minimum include: long-standing Sino-Russian border disputes; competing Russian
and Japanese claims to the Northern Territories; the unresolved dispute between Japan
and South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks in the southern Sea of Japan; divided
sovereignty on the Korean peninsula, where 1.2 million ROK and DPRK ground forces
remain deployed against each other across the demilitarized zone; competing sovereignty
claims of the Chinese regimes on mainland China and Taiwan; the unresolved dispute
between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea; and the
competing claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands among China, Brunei, Vietnam,
Malaysia, Taiwan, and the Philippines.95
With the perceived descendancy of U.S. power in the region, and, indeed a real
descendancy if this thesis' proposals for restructuring were implemented, the regional
powers would likely engage in a struggle for regional hegemony. This struggle is bound
to occur eventually, as the U.S. can not remain physically engaged in Asia forever.
When it does occur, each of the countries of the region is going to want to assume their
rightful position in whatever system emerges. The key is to try to control the dimensions
of that struggle, and influence it to gain outcomes that would be favorable to U.S.
interests in the region. Multilateralism and the formation of regional security groups
represent a means to control that struggle, and reduce the levels of unpredictability in the
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region. Stability in Asia depends upon the benign coexistence between the region's
nations. Multilateralism makes this benign coexistence easier to accomplish.
B. REGIONAL ARMS RACE
The void left by a U.S. restructuring is likely to cause defense build-ups across the
board in Asia as each of the countries vie for positions within the region. It can be
argued that such a regional arms race is already taking place among the industrialized
countries of Asia. This militarization is just a side effect of the rapid economic growth
that the countries of the region have experienced over the past several decades. As their
involvement in the international economy grows, so does their need for an expanding
military to ensure their continued access to the global market and maintenance of their
financial, trade, and diplomatic ties with other countries. These arms races also are the
result of the perceived shifts in geopolitical power of the U.S. and China within the
region, with the latter on the ascendancy and the former being seen as in decline. The on-
going and across-the-board modernization and expansion of the arsenals of the countries
in the region, and especially within ASEAN, is an example of the states preparing for the
real possibility of major changes to the broader strategic environment in the longer
term.
96 The prospect of an arms race in Southeast Asia and uncertainty about the
directions of the defense policies of Japan, China, and South Korea encouraged advocates
of various forms of multilateralism.97
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C. FEAR OF JAPANESE MILITARISM
An ideology that must be overcome in U.S. foreign policy, and in the foreign
policies of Japan's neighbors, if collective security is to work in Asia is the fear of the
revival of Japanese militarism. These notions are simply outdated. Imperial Japan's
expansionism in the 1930s and 1940s, as horrible as it was, arose from a specific set of
conditions that bore little resemblance to the current or any reasonably foreseeable
situation.
98 The insecurities of pre-World War JJ Japan stemmed from the fact that they
were a burgeoning world power without the natural resources to sustain such aspirations.
Thus they set out with expansionist foreign policy to accrue these natural resources and
ensure their place among the world's great powers. Modern Japan is a completely
different state. Japan already is one of the world's great powers and global economic
interdependence provides Japan with her necessary resources. Japan would have nothing
to gain from the use of military action to overturn the present world order. Perhaps more
than any other nation, Japan benefits from international trade and neither needs nor has
the incentive to attempt to alter this ideal situation through the use of military force."
It must be noted, though, that the fears of the other Asian countries of resurgent
Japanese militarism can not be completely discounted. Whether real or imagined,
perceptions of Tokyo's intentions could prompt regional actors who feel threatened by
Japan to react in a manner inconsistent with normal balancing, thus creating instability
and conditions prejudicial to U.S. security interests. 100 Japan's refusal to admit the
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wrongdoings of its previous military regimes does not help the situation. Such penitence
could go a long way to appease some of the fears of the countries of the region. No
amount of confidence building and information sharing will eliminate completely
suspicions about Japan's true intentions in Asia unless that country unambiguously
comes to terms with its historical legacy.
101
Recent action among these lines has
occurred between Japan and South Korea as Japan formally apologized to South Korea
for its harsh 35-year colonial rule of South Korea from 1910-1945. But mainstreamers
in Japan, which include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Agency and the
Self-Defense Forces, and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, do not see any particular
need to offer a systemic apology for Japan's past errors in order to regain the trust of its
Asian neighbors, although they pay lip service to this effort. 103 Sincere efforts by the
Japanese to reconcile with its past must occur to ease the historical tensions among the
countries in the region. Also, both East Asian and U.S. officials need to outgrow the
simplistic assumption that Japan's military role must inevitably be one of extremes -
either the rampant expansionism of six decades ago or the self-effacing dependency of
the post-World War JJ era. They would likely play a role somewhere in between, that of
a typical prosperous and conservative great power in the international system. 104
Hints of Japanese nationalism also make the other countries of the region feel
uncomfortable. This nationalism has shown many different faces in Japan.
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Japanese nationalism expresses itself in pride in the recovery from World War
II and the surge to the forefront of global economies. That has been tempered by
the bursting of the bubble economy of the late 1980s and 1990s. Japanese today
are searching for a new identity and spiritual values to dilute materialism while
avoiding the ultranationalism of the 1930s. 105
This nationalism, or more importantly to Japan's neighbors, this perceived nationalism,
has manifested itself in various ways. Some of these expressions may seem somewhat
trivial to Westerners, but are readily noted throughout Northeast Asia. Such examples
include: visits by high-ranking government officials, including former Prime Minister
Hashimoto, to the Yasukuni Shrine to the Japanese war dead, which includes executed
war criminals; attempts by Japanese historians to "revise" Japan's school history books to
remove the "masochistic" accounts of Japan's war crimes; 106 and the making of a movie
which portrays as a hero General Hideki Tojo, whom Americans tried and hanged for his
World War n crimes. 107 While such nationalistic trends may seem minute to some,
others worry that these trends represent a flux that could usher in a new era of
xenophobia. Although it is probably true that the Japanese need to practice a bit more
political sensitivity in such expressions of their nationalistic pride, for other East Asian
countries to worry about Japanese xenophobia seems both paranoid and premature.
Japanese society has directed its pride toward economic advances in previous decades,
and until their economy recovers from its current slump, will continue to search for
outlets for its nationalistic pride. It is possible that these outlets are tied to Japan's rich
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heritage and spiritual values, and when thus expressed by Japanese society, should not be
viewed by Japan's neighbors as an ominous development.
D. MULTILATERALISM AND REGIONAL SECURITY GROUPS
The key to ensuring that these trends of expanding militaries and increased fears
of such militarization does not harm the stability of the region lies in multilateral security
groups and the encouragement of confidence and security building measures among the
players. Unlike Europe, Asia has not had much practice with multilateralism.
Throughout the Cold War, Asian countries survived with various bilateral agreements
placing them on either side of the bipolar world or leaving them in the middle without
specific commitments to either side. In Asia, a set of U.S.-centered bilateral relationships
became the central organizing principle, with multilateralism marginalized overall. 109
Bilateral arrangements alone will not suffice in Asia in the post-Cold War era, regional
security groups need to be stressed. Japan could reasonably be expected to play a leading
role in such security groups. American officials ought to adopt the position that, as the
principal great power in the region, Japan will be expected to help stabilize East Asia,
contribute to the resolution of disputes, and contain disruptive or expansionist threats that
might emerge. 110 If the U.S. were to restructure or reduce its presence in Asia,
multilateralism could be a means to ensure a smooth transition.
Security dialogues between the countries, like those of the Northeast Asia
Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Regional Forum (ARF), and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asian Pacific
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(CSCAP) need to continue to occur. Such forums provide for confidence building
measures and information sharing that help to quell the historical fears that the countries
of the region have of each other. It has become increasingly clear that such confidence
and security building measures, properly crafted and carefully applied, are indeed
appropriate to the Asia Pacific region in the post-Cold War era. 111 The U.S. should use
its influence in the region to keep all of the players at the discussion table, particularly
Japan, South Korea, and China.
There still remain, though, certain impediments that limit the range of discussion
at these security dialogues between Japan and her Northeast Asian neighbors. Historical,
territorial, and ideological confrontations continue to inhibit complete trust and
confidence building between the nations. Territorial disputes remain between Japan and
her neighbors (with South Korea over Takeshima, with China over Senkaku, and with
Russia over the Northern Territories) that linger as possible catalysts to conflict. Also,
China and both Koreas are skeptical of the reinvigorated security alliance between the
U.S. and Japan as laid out at the Clinton-Hashimoto summit of 1996. Koreans are critical
of an increased Japanese role in the U.S.-Japan security alliance and China views the
April 1996 pledge by the U.S. and Japan to reinvigorate security ties as a containment
strategy against them. Beijing has insisted that the purpose of reinvigorating the
transpacific defense alliance and allowing greater Japanese participation in regional
security is to thwart China's leadership ambitions both in Asia and in the world. 112
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Although the U.S. would deny such a containment policy, the U.S. approach toward
strengthening Japan's role in the region and encouraging multilateralism in the region is a
form of containment, but a benign one that encourages China's participation in the
system.
Regardless of the impediments, multilateralism has caught on in the Asia Pacific
region, especially in Southeast Asia, since the end of the Cold War.
Asia's former inability to move beyond a multi-pronged bilateral stage began to
change toward the end of the Cold War. . . Multilateralism was a means to
simultaneously retain the engagement of the United States and pre-emptively constrain
the potential power of the region's indigenous major powers - China and Japan. 113
Multilateralism is favored by many of the region's players, but for different reasons. 114
China sees multilateralism as a way to become a "normal" security country. South Korea
has been at the forefront of multilateralism, proposing the Northeast Asia Security
Dialogue (NEASED), a "track one" organization for enhancing and implementing
confidence-building measures, which has not yet come to fruition. Korea sees
multilateralism as a means to control its own fate in the international arena, which is a
position that Korea has not held historically. Seoul's approach, moreover, reflects ROK
recognition that the growing power of China and Japan require South Korea to hedge its
bets through multilateralism. 115 Japan could use multilateralism to minimize the fears of
its neighbors concerning various initiatives that Japan would probably undergo upon a
U.S. restructuring. The U.S., in turn, should view multilateralism as a de facto "exit
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strategy," to develop an environment in the region that could peacefully function without
the current level of hard U.S. commitment.
Regional security groups have existed in Asia for a few years with reasonable
success, albeit at a track two level. CSCAP, which pre-dates ARF, has become a
valuable colloquium for these countries to discuss security matters. CSCAP is a non-
governmental or "track two" organization that enables government officials to engage in
policy-related discussions with academicians, security specialists, and former foreign
ministry and defense officials. Because government representatives participate in their
private capacities, they are not bound by official positions, and, consequently, usually
feel freer to push the envelope in seeking solutions to a variety of issues.
116
The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) is a similar track two
organization. NEACD, which is sponsored by the Institute on Global Conflict and
Cooperation (IGCC), a state-wide policy research institute of the University of
California, is planning its eighth in a series of high-level, track two consultations between
China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States. North Korea has participated
in all aspects of planning, but has yet to send members to the actual meetings. The eighth
round of discussions, planned for November 1998 in Moscow, will continue to reduce




Japan Economic Institute of America, "Japan Strives to Raise Profile on Regional Security," JEI Report
No. 8 (Vol. 1997), February 28, 1997, 3.
117 NEACD information obtained from Michael Stanciewicz, Coordinator for NEACD, at Naval
Postgraduate School symposium, Monterey, CA, November 5, 1998.
68
ARF is considered a "track one" organization, but, until recently, has stayed out
of the security arena and focused on issues primarily relating to economics, especially
within Southeast Asia. But in recent years, ARF has gained the participation of Japan
and Korea and is encouraging greater sharing of defense-related information and
discussion of security issues among its members. For Japan to realize its potential as a
regional leader, that country must continue to engage in activities aimed at building
confidence and trust in Asia. Multilateral forums, such as ARF, NEACD, and CSCAP,
certainly are appropriate venues for Tokyo to contribute constructively to the regional
security debate.
118 The U.S. must continue to encourage Japan to make these
contributions.
Multilateralism in Asia, though, is not a panacea. Bilateral arrangements are
deeply embedded in Asia and can not be tossed aside. Multilateral and bilateral
arrangements can, and have been, complementary.
Both the Bush and Clinton administrations preferred to base the U.S. approach
to multilateralism upon existing bilateral ties, thereby creating a two-tiered
system. This meshed very well with Asian aspirations for new opportunities via
multilateralism without risking the support of the bilateral ties. 11
It remains to be said, that multilateralism, or even the two-tiered approach, will take time
to develop, but must not be discarded for lack of efficacy. Even in Europe, which was
much better suited for multilateral approaches, it took about twenty years for regional
security groups to start producing real initiatives. These approaches must be given
similar timeframes in Asia to take hold.
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The maintenance of the current force structure of U.S. troops in Asia is an attempt
to freeze the Pacific in a Cold War framework. Although it is clear that a prosperous and
open Asia Pacific is a key to the economic health of the U.S., the U.S. can still achieve its
desired results in the region even with changes to their hard commitments there. The
U.S. can achieve its national security objectives in the Asia Pacific region without such a
massive forward-stationed military presence there. This policy suggests a rational
restructuring to relieve various stresses on the existing structure, not American
isolationism.
The missions of these forward-stationed troops in the Asia Pacific region have
changed with the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, their roles were cut and
dry: to combat communism. In the post-Cold War era, these troops remain in the region
to battle uncertainty. Such a role does not warrant their existence in the region. The
rationale for the presence has disappeared. The waning public opinion in both Japan and
the U.S. for maintaining these troops in the region, the current Asian economic crisis, and
the American desire to reduce defense expenditures also provide ample justification for
restructuring the forward-stationed troops.
The best way to continue to satisfy American goals in the region and alleviate
some of the pressures now stressing the system would be to remain engaged with a power
projection strategy. This strategy would call for the continued stationing of U.S. naval
forces in the region and the removal and relocation of the majority of American ground
and air forces in the region to other U.S. territories in the Pacific. These relocated air and
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ground troops could serve their same purpose from Hawaii or Guam and could be
effectively tailored for deployment from these American bastions in the Pacific, while the
naval forces would remain available in the region for rapid response to most
contingencies. The U.S. should also consider measures to "Koreanize" the defense of
Korea to accelerate the possible peaceful reunification on the peninsula. All of these
restructuring initiatives should be taken with a continued emphasis on engagement with
the countries of the region and their militaries and continued guaranteed access to the
military facilities in the region if deemed necessary by the United States.
Such restructuring, though, would encounter several obstacles. It is how these
obstacles are dealt with that could go a long way toward the maintenance of stability in
the region. The removal of most of the U.S. troops from the region could cause a power
struggle within the region, as the region's existing powers and the region's burgeoning
powers would all be looking to stake their claims as the regional security leader or in
support of such a leader. As a prosperous, capable, and conservative great power, Japan
would normally be the primary stabilizer in the region and bear the costs and risks of
doing so. It would also serve as the principal strategic counterweight to an increasingly
assertive China. 120 Such a balancing within the region could lead to increased stability
there. If harnessed properly by the U.S., this potential power vacuum could be filled with
all-inclusive multilateral security groups, something the region has never had. The
relocation of U.S. forces could serve as a centripetal force drawing the countries of the
region closer together into regional security groups. The historical animosities between
72
certain countries of the region would and does act as an obstacle to such optimistic
occurrences, but the U.S. should use its influence to get past such obstacles. Any signs of
remorse by the Japanese for the atrocities its military committed in World War II would
be perceived favorably by the other countries of the region. For, only if Japan
forthrightly eschews its imperialist past can it even begin to conceive of playing a
political leadership role in Asia free of the charge that it is seeking to reconstruct the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the euphemistic term the Japanese gave to
describe their World War II occupation of other East Asian nations. 121
A continued U.S. commitment to the Asia Pacific region is a reality of the
unforeseeable future. All players benefit economically and strategically from the U.S.
presence in the region. In the post-Cold War era though, this presence does not have be
in the form of forward-stationed troops on Asian countries' soil. The U.S. can satisfy the
national security objectives it seeks by shifting to a power projection strategy with a
forward-deployed naval force as the centerpiece.
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